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Abstract
& Everyday contextual settings create associations that later
afford generating predictions about what objects to expect in
our environment. The cortical network that takes advantage of
such contextual information is proposed to connect the rep-
resentation of associated objects such that seeing one object
(bed) will activate the visual representations of other objects
sharing the same context (pillow). Given this proposal, we hy-
pothesized that the cortical activity elicited by seeing a strong
contextual object would predict the occurrence of false mem-
ories whereby one erroneously ‘‘remembers’’ having seen a new
object that is related to a previously presented object. To test
this hypothesis, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging
during encoding of contextually related objects, and later tested
recognition memory. New objects that were contextually related
to previously presented objects were more often falsely judged
as ‘‘old’’ compared with new objects that were contextually
unrelated to old objects. This phenomenon was reflected by
activity in the cortical network mediating contextual processing,
which provides a better understanding of how the brain repre-
sents and processes context. &
INTRODUCTION
Memory for past events is not perfect; it typically involves
forgetting, adding to, or distorting details of an actual
episode (Loftus, 2003; Schacter, 1999; Bartlett, 1932).
One common type of memory distortion is referred to
as ‘‘false recognition’’: an incorrect claim to have seen
or encountered a novel object or an event (Slotnick &
Schacter,2004;Roediger&McDermott,1995;Underwood,
1965). We hypothesize that one source for such memory
errors is related to the coactivation of contextually related
objects in memory.
In everyday life, we do not encounter objects in iso-
lation but rather, they are embedded in a context with
other objects that frequently share the same context. For
example, when walking into a bedroom, one typically
encounters a bed, a dresser, a mirror, and an alarm clock
nearby. Similarly, when encountering a cluster of bal-
loons, we often expect a celebratory event that frequently
involves gifts, a cake, and candles. Our experience with
such typical settings creates in memory collections of
contextually associated objects, termed ‘‘context frames’’
(Bar, 2004; Bar & Ullman, 1996). This study examines
how the context-based coactivation of such associations,
and the corresponding neuronal activity of the context
processing regions of the brain, contributes to false rec-
ognition of common objects. In other words, whether the
exposure to a strong contextual object (e.g., a traffic light)
affects our memory such that we later falsely believe that
a contextually related object (e.g., parking meter) has
been presented previously although it has not. Address-
ing this question will help to illuminate the cortical mech-
anisms mediating the phenomenon of false memory, and
potentially shed more light on our understanding of the
organization of contextual associations in the brain.
Prior studies have shown an increased likelihood of
incorrectly recalling an object that is contextually related
to an object previously encountered in a scene, com-
pared with an unrelated object. For instance, Brewer
and Treyens (1981) left participants in an office for
10 min, after which the participants were moved out of
that office to another a room, where a surprise memory
recall test was administered. Participants falsely ‘‘re-
called’’ items that were contextually congruent with an
office more often than items that were not contextually
congruent. Miller and Gazzaniga (1998) demonstrated
similar contextual effects. Participants were shown a
series of Norman Rockwell illustrations of typical scenes
(e.g., a beach) and were subsequently tested on their
memory for the items within the scenes. Participants
were more likely to produce false alarms to items that
were contextually congruent with the scenes (e.g., a
beach ball) compared with items that were unrelated
(e.g., a chalkboard).
Both of these previous studies relied on entire scenes
to generate false memory. Therefore, in addition to our
novel examination of the neural correlates of context-
based false recognition, the present study goes beyond
previous reports by investigating the actual mechanism
by which individual objects can evoke an activation
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subsequent false recognition.
The neural origins of contextually related false memo-
ries are largely unknown. Recent work (Aminoff, Gronau,
& Bar, 2007; Bar, 2004; Bar & Aminoff, 2003) has revealed
three main cortical areas that mediate contextual process-
ing: the parahippocampal cortex (PHC), the retrosplenial
complex (RSC), and a third focus in the medial prefrontal
cortex (MPFC) observed under certain task demands
(Bar, 2007; Bar, Aminoff, Mason, & Fenske, 2007). Using
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) across
several studies, these regions were found to be selectively
activated when participants viewed objects with strong
contextual associations (e.g., a traffic light, strongly asso-
ciated with a street context; or a baby bottle, strongly
associated with the context of a baby) compared with
objects with weak contextual associations (e.g., a camera,
not specifically associated with a particular contextual set-
ting). We concluded that the PHC, the RSC, and the MPFC
constitute a network subserving contextual associations
(a context network ‘‘localizer’’ is available at http://barlab.
mgh.harvard.edu/ContextLocalizer.htm). The character-
ization of a neural system for contextual processing pro-
vides a basis for exploring the neural activity associated
with contextually related false memories. Specifically,
we hypothesize that the coactivation of these contex-
tual associations at the time of encoding is responsible
for subsequent false recognition of related contextual
objects. To examine the neural origins of such false
recognition, we used a subsequent memory paradigm
in which neural activity at the time of encoding is re-
lated to later remembering or forgetting (Brewer, Zhao,
Desmond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 1998; Wagner et al., 1998).
The subsequent memory paradigm was previously ap-
plied to false recognition in a study by Gonsalves and
Paller (2000), who used it to examine neural events at
encoding associated with perceiving versus imagining an
object as a function of true or false recognition on a later
test. Using this paradigm allows us to examine encoding
activity as a function of later recognition accuracy on an
item-by-item basis (Gonsalves & Paller, 2000). The subse-
quent memory method has been successfully used in
prior work to examine the origins of different types of
memory errors, including source monitoring (Gonsalves
et al., 2004; Gonsalves & Paller, 2000), emotional content
influences on source monitoring (Kensinger & Schacter,
2005), and when general information, rather than specific
information, is retained in memory (Garoff, Slotnick, &
Schacter, 2005).
Our main hypothesis is that increased activity in the
cortical network that subserves contextual processing
will be predictive of subsequent false recognition of
objects that are contextually related to the presented
object. According to this hypothesis, greater activity
elicited in the context cortical network would indicate
an increased activation of contextually related objects,
and this increased activation of contextually related
objects would, in turn, lead to increased likelihood of
false recognition of these related items.
In the present study, participants were scanned using
fMRI during the encoding phase of the experiment. We
designed a novel paradigm where two common visual
objects were presented simultaneously on each encod-
ing trial, and participants were asked to ‘‘put the two
objects together into a context and to press a button
based on how many objects they associated with the
context’’ on a 4-point scale (see Methods). The pairs of
objects were of one of two types: either two strong
contextual objects that belonged to the same context
(e.g., a bulldozer and a construction cone) or two weak
contextual objects that were not related to each other
(e.g., a camera and a pair of scissors; Figure 1). A day
after the encoding phase, participants performed, out-
side of the scanner, an old–new recognition memory
test in which they were presented with words depicting
objects from one of four types of categories: (1) strong
contextual objects that were presented at encoding (e.g.,
bulldozer; old–strong item); (2) weak contextual objects
presented at encoding (e.g., camera; old–weak item);
(3) strong contextual objects related to the context
presented at encoding, but that did not actually appear
at encoding (e.g., crib, with relation to baby bottle and
stroller presented at encoding; new–related lure item);
and (4) novel objects (both strong and weak contextual)
not related to any object or context presented at encod-
ing (e.g., disco ball; new–unrelated baseline).
METHODS
Participants
Twenty-five participants were scanned in this experiment.
Nine participants were excluded from the analysis based
Figure 1. Experimental design. Participants were scanned while
presented with pairs of objects that either had strong contextual
associations or weak contextual associations. The following day,
participants were tested for their memory with words. Based on
their response, encoding trials were defined as trials that led to
a hit, miss, false alarm, and correct rejection.
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16 participants consisted of 6 women (15/16 right hand
dominant), with a mean age of 26.75 years (SD = 3.67) All
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Informed written consent was obtained from each of the
participants prior to the scanning sessions. All procedures
were approved by Massachusetts General Hospital Hu-
man Studies Protocol number 2001-001754.
Stimuli
Visual objects used in the experiment were either strongly
related to a particular context (SC), or weakly associated
with many contexts (WC) (see Figure 1). Objects were
rated as either SC or WC based on previous pilot surveys
as described in Bar and Aminoff (2003). There were a
total of 84 different contexts presented to the participant.
There were three different objects associated with each
context: two ‘‘key’’ objects, rated as most typical in the
context, and one ‘‘relevant’’ object that was not highly
associated with the context. Each participant at encoding
saw one key object and one relevant object from each
context on a given a trial. The purpose of this balancing
was that one key object would be shown at encoding, and
the other at test as a contextual lure item. Key objects
were balanced between participants. There were a total of
252 SC objects used in this experiment, where only 168 of
the SC objects were shown at encoding. There were also
a total of 144 WC objects used at encoding. Fifty-seven
new–unrelated objects were used as new items at test to
obtain a baseline false alarm rate.
Procedure
Participants were scanned while they viewed photo-
graphs of everyday objects on a gray background. On
each trial, two objects were presented side by side in the
center of the screen. Each individual picture was 98 of
visual angle; the two pictures together spanned a visual
angle of 208. The pictures of objects were presented
on a black screen. Each picture pair was presented for
1500 msec and there was a 1500-msec interstimulus
interval. Picture trials were intermixed with fixation trials
in a predetermined order to maximize efficiency and
accuracy in extracting the hemodynamic response func-
tion (order was created by the function optseq, part of
the FreeSurfer toolbox; http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.
edu/optseq/). There were a total of 156 picture trials
(84 SC trials and 72 WC trials) and 126 fixation trials
spread over three functional runs.
The task for participants was to try to create a context
between the two objects, and to press a button based on
how many objects they associate with the context.
Participants pressed ‘‘1’’ if they associated many objects
with the context; ‘‘2’’ if they associated just a few ad-
ditional items with context; ‘‘3’’ if they could take the
two objects presented and put them into a context
together but did not associate any other objects with
the context; and ‘‘4’’ if they could not even put the two
objects presented in a context together.
The next day, participants returned for the testing
period of the experiment. In the test, a word was pre-
sented and the participant determined whether the word
was presented the day before as a picture, and thus, is
‘‘old’’; or if the word was not a picture presented the day
beforeandtherefore is‘‘new.’’Iftheparticipantsdecided
the word was ‘‘old,’’ they were asked to make a further
judgment of whether they vividly remember seeing the
picture (i.e., ‘‘remember’’), or if they just had a feeling of
knowing that theword was presentedas apicture theday
before (i.e., ‘‘know’’). Each word corresponded to one of
four conditions: a strong contextual item presented the
day before as a picture (strong–old); a weak contextual
item presented the day before (weak–old); a strong
contextually item related to a contextually related pair at
encoding (strong–lure); and a new item unrelated to any
of the pictures presented at encoding (new–unrelated).
The contexts were split such that half the contexts (n =
42) were presented with a strong context old item, and
the other half (n = 42) were presented with a strong
context lure item. Contexts were balanced between par-
ticipants. Half the weak context items presented at en-
codingwerepresentedattestasaweak–olditem(n=36).
There were 57 new–unrelated trials.
Imaging Parameters
The participants engaged in the encoding phase while
whole-brain fMRI scans were collected on a 3-Tesla
Siemens Allegra head-only scanner using a gradient
echo-planar imaging sequence (TR = 3000 msec, TE =
25 msec, flip angle = 908). The acquired slices were axial,
parallel to the anterior commissure–posterior commis-
sure line (33 slices, 3 mm, 1 mm skip). Each participant
participated in a series of anatomical scans as well as
three functional scans.
Data Analysis
The data from seven participants that were originally
scanned were excluded from the analysis because we
used a criterion of at least 10 observations per partic-
ipant in the strong false alarm condition to provide
sufficient numbers of trials for the fMRI analysis. Two
participants were excluded from the analyses because
they did not show activation of the context network indi-
cated by comparing strong to weak trials. The remaining
16 participants were averaged in the group analysis.
Functional data were analyzed using the FreeSurfer
analysis tools. Data from individual fMRI runs were first
corrected for motion using the AFNI package (Cox,1996)
and spatially smoothed with a Gaussian full-width, half-
maximum (FWHM) filter of 5 mm. The intensities for all
runs were then normalized to correct for signal intensity
2228 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 20, Number 12changes and temporal drift, with global rescaling for
each run to a mean intensity of 1000.
Performance on the memory test the day after the
scanning session was used to back-sort the trials at
encoding. Thus, each trial at encoding was defined by
the performance at test. Signal intensity for each con-
dition was then computed and averaged across runs. A
finite impulse response model was used for the analysis.
To account for intrinsic serial correlation in the fMRI data
within participants, we used a global autocorrelation func-
tion that computes a whitening filter (Burock & Dale,
2000). The data were then tested for statistical signifi-
cance and activation maps were constructed for compar-
isons of the different conditions. Both group-average
activation maps as well as regions of interest (ROIs) are
random effect analyses.
Cortical Surface-based Analysis
Once the data from all trials were averaged, the mean
and variance volumes were resampled onto the corti-
cal surface for each participant. Each hemisphere was
then morphed into a sphere in the following manner
(Segonne et al., 2004; Fischl, Liu, & Dale, 2001; Dale,
Fischl, & Sereno, 1999; Fischl, Sereno, & Dale, 1999).
First, each cortical hemisphere was morphed into a met-
rically optimal spherical surface. The pattern of corti-
cal folds was then represented as a function on a unit
sphere. Next, each individual participant’s spherical rep-
resentation was aligned with an averaged folding pattern
constructed from a larger number of individuals aligned
previously. This alignment was accomplished by max-
imizing the correlation between the individual and the
group, while prohibiting changes in the surface topology
and simultaneously penalizing excessive metric distor-
tion (Fischl, Sereno, Tootell, & Dale, 1999).
Region-of-interest Analysis
The ROIs for this study were chosen by the results of the
strong versus weak contrast. The PHC ROIs as well as the
MPFC RH were included as well due to a priori hypoth-
esis of the involvement in contextual processing (Bar,
2004). The PHC, RSC, and MPFC ROIs were defined
structurally. The structural constraint of the PHC (encom-
passing the collateral sulcus and the parahippocampal
gyrus) was based on a hand labeling of different brain
structures for each participant. The PHC was defined
using procedures elaborated in Insausti et al. (1998) and
Reber, Wong, and Buxton (2002). The RSC was hand-
labeled on each individual using a structural constraint
based on anatomical landmarks of the calcarine sulcus,
the parieto-occipital sulcus, the corpus callosum, and the
posterior cingulate sulcus (refer to Figure 2). The MPFC
was defined as anterior to the corpus callosum, and in
front of and below the cingulate sulcus. The lateral pa-
rietal cortex (LP) and the occipito-temporal sulcus (OTS)
ROIs were defined functionally. The anatomical location
of the LP and OTS ROIs were defined by the cluster of ac-
tivity significant in the strong versus weak contrast from
the group analysis and then projected back to each in-
dividual’s brain. For all ROIs, a functional constraint was
used either by selecting the subset of voxels within each
of these labels which demonstrated a significant effect of
context (i.e., significant in the strong versus weak con-
trast) when examining the activation related to false rec-
ognition, or by any component of the task, as revealed by
the main effect (i.e., all vs. fixation contrast) when exam-
ining the activation related to hits and misses. All of the
voxels that met these constraints were then averaged,
allowing the contrasts of interest to be computed across
the resulting time courses. An outlier analysis was per-
formed for each ROI, on each individual participant, such
that the signal was averaged across conditions. If a par-
ticipant had an average signal that was above the statisti-
cal threshold of 2.5 standard deviations from the mean
of the group, they were considered an outlier and re-
moved from the analysis for that specific ROI. In only the
right RSC was an outlier found and is noted within the
results. A one-way repeated-measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA) was performed for experimental conditions on
the mean percentage of peak signal change calculated
for each condition.
RESULTS
To test our hypothesis, we first examined whether con-
text indeed affects old–new recognition performance,
which would be indicated by a significantly higher false
alarm rate for the new–related lures compared with the
new–unrelated baseline items. Second, to examine the
neural regions that predict the occurrence of subsequent
contextually related false recognition, we compared neu-
ral activity at encoding between the strong contextual
pairs that led to a subsequent false alarm and the strong
contextual pairs that led to a subsequent correct rejection
of the new–related lure items. We hypothesized that
regions that mediate the processing of contextual associ-
ations would demonstrate increased fMRI signal for those
encoding trials that lead to subsequent false alarms
compared with trials that lead to subsequent correct
rejections. Such a result would support an account of
false recognition whereby such errors stem from context-
related coactivations.
Behavioral Results
Encoding Task
As noted earlier, the encoding task required participants
to respond on a 4-point scale, where ‘‘1’’ reflected many
associated objects with the context of the pair and ‘‘4’’
reflected an inability to relate the two objects presented
to a shared context. The average response in the strong
contextual trials was 1.43 (SD = .37), whereas the average
Aminoff, Schacter, and Bar 2229response for the weak contextual trials was 3.27 (SD =
.51). This difference in relating the two objects to a larger
contextwasstatistically significant [t(15)= 15.4,p<. 0 0 1 ] ,
validating our initial distinction between strong and weak
contextual objects pairs. There was also a significant re-
action time difference in the encoding task when compar-
ing the strong contextual trials (1.42 sec) to the weak
contextual trials [1.7 sec, t(15) = 4.26, p <. 0 0 1 ] .W e
attribute this reaction time difference to the difficulty of
determining whether the weak contextual pair of objects
fit into a context together and the ease to which a context
was found for the strong contextual trials.
Recognition Task
A significant effect of contextual associations was ob-
tained for the likelihood of false recognition to a related
item, relative to unrelated new item (see Table 1). Spe-
cifically, participants made 18% more false recognition
responses (i.e., rating a new item as ‘‘old’’) for contex-
tually related lure (new–related) items compared to
novel, unrelated items [new–unrelated; t(15) = 6.75,
p < .001]. A similar contextual effect was also obtained
for true recognition of old items in the strong (old–
strong) versus the weak (old–weak) contextual condi-
tion. Namely, participants recognized 21% more strong
than weak old contextual items [t(15) = 6.95, p < .001].
Although no significant differences in reaction times
were found at test, participants were faster to respond
in the encoding phase to the strong contextual trials
that later led to a false alarm (1.38 sec) compared to
those trials that led to correct rejections (1.43 sec), hits
(1.43 sec), and misses (1.53 sec). This difference only
reached marginal significance at a two-tailed comparison
with correct rejections [t(15) = 2.00, p < .06] and hits
[t(15) = 1.84, p < .09]. There was no significant reac-
tion time differences between the weak contextual trials
that resulted in a subsequent hit (1.69 sec) versus a miss
[1.71, t(15) < .7].
An ANOVA demonstrated a marginal effect of re-
sponse choice (i.e., the 4-point scale determining the
Table 1. Recognition Memory Performance
Recognition Memory
Response
Condition ‘‘Old’’ ‘‘New’’
Old–Strong 65 (R = 55) 35
Old–Weak 44 (R = 43) 56
New–Related (lure) 45 (R = 33) 55
New–Unrelated (baseline) 27 (R = 31) 73
Average of 16 participants. Numbers represent the percentage of trials
of each condition that were perceived as old and new at test. Within
the old trials, the percentage of ‘‘remember’’ responses compared to
‘‘know’’ responses are in parentheses.
Figure 2. Statistical
parametric maps representing
the difference between viewing
a pair of objects that strongly
relates to a specific context
and viewing a pair of objects
that does not associate with
any context, or weakly
associates with many. This is
a random effects average of
16 participants. This contrast
resulted in differential
activation in the retrosplenial
complex (RSC), the medial
prefrontal cortex (MPFC),
regions of the lateral
parietal cortex (LP), and
the occipito-temporal
sulcus (OTS). The results
of this analysis were used
to define the ROIs in
order to examine the relation
between contextual processing
in the brain and false
recognition of contextually
related objects. Bottom insert
box delineates the region
within the medial parietal cortex
included in the RSC region of
interest (outlined in green).
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encoding on subsequent memory performance of the
strong contextual trials [F(45, 3) = 2.58, p < .07]. There
was no significant difference in the rating response at
encoding between the weak hits (3.24) compared to the
weak misses [3.3, t(15) < 0.53].
fMRI Results
Localizing the Context Network
The initial stage of the fMRI analysis was to localize areas
within the cortex that show differential activity specific
to contextual processing. To accomplish this objective,
trials in which the participants associated the pair of
objects with a context with other objects (i.e., a re-
sponse of ‘‘1’’ or ‘‘2’’) were compared with the trials in
which the participant did not associate the pair of
objects with any context and therefore were considered
a weak context, or a noncontextual trial (i.e., a response
Figure 3. ROI analysis for regions that process contextual associations. Conditions shown are the encoding data for the strong contextual
trials that, at test, participants had to determine if a related lure item was old (i.e., a false alarm) or new (i.e., a correct rejection). Error bars
represent one standard error. *p < .05.
Table 2. Statistical t and p Values for ROI Analysis Comparing
Encoding Data for Trials that Led to Subsequent False Alarm
with Data for Trials that Led to Subsequent Correct Rejections
ROI n t Statistic p
RSC LH 16 3.20 .005*
RSC RH 15 2.44 .028*
MPFC LH 16 2.88 .011*
MPFC RH 16 .94 .36
LP LH 16 2.64 .018*
LP RH 16 2.13 .05*
PHC LH 16 .85 .4
PHC RH 16 .40 .69
OTS LH 16 .53 .6
All p values are for two-tailed significance.
*p < .05.
Aminoff, Schacter, and Bar 2231of ‘‘4’’). The results of this comparison can be seen in
Figure 2. The differential activity exhibited from this con-
trast revealed four main sites of activation: the bilat-
eral RSC [which includes the retrosplenial cortex, and
parts of the precuneus and posterior cingulate; Talairach:
LH (6, 56, 18), RH (4, 47, 15)], the left MPFC
[Talairach: LH (9, 41, 6)], the bilateral lateral parietal
[LP, including areas of the inferior parietal lobule, and the
supramarginal gyrus; Talairach: LH (44, 66, 36) and
(45, 42, 56), RH (26, 64, 52) and (46, 51, 42)], and
an area within the left occipito-temporal sulcus [OTS;
Talairach: (56, 51, 10)]. Out of these four sites, all
were more active for context trials compared to no-
context trials except for the OTS, which showed greater
activity for the no-context trials compared to context
trials. This analysis was used to determine the ROIs in
order to examine what activity at encoding is related to
contextual false recognition. Based on our previous re-
search on cortical areas mediating contextual associa-
tions, we included a PHC ROI and a left hemisphere
MPFC, both of which have been shown to be involved in
contextual processing. We discuss later the implications
of why PHC activity was not evident in the contrast
comparing context to no-context pairs.
False Alarm vs. Correct Rejection of New–Related Items
ROI analyses were run on all the regions that exhibited
differential activity in context compared to the no-context
trials as well as the PHC, to investigate whether activa-
tion at encoding in these regions related to subsequent
false recognition of contextually related items. Results
are shown in Figure 3 and Table 2. Descriptions of how
the ROIs were labeled in each individual can be found in
the Methods section. In each ROI, we compared activity
at encoding elicited for those trials that led to a false
Figure 4. ROI analysis for regions that process contextual associations. Trends were similar in both hemispheres, and thus, collapsed in
the figure for simplicity. Conditions shown are the encoding data for the subsequent memory of an old item. Items were identified as strong
or weak based on the initial presentation of the object: either in a strong contextual pair (strong) or in a pair of weak contextual objects
(weak). Items correctly identified as old were considered a hit or if the old item was misidentified as new, it was considered a miss. Error bars
represent one standard error.
2232 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 20, Number 12recognition of a contextually related item (i.e., a false
alarm) with the activity elicited for those trials that led to
a subsequent correct rejection, where participants cor-
rectly identified the new item as new. Only voxels within
these ROIs that demonstrated a significant differential
activity for context versus no-context were included in
the analysis defined on a participant-by-participant basis.
In the right RSC, one participant was removed due to
particularly noisy data in this specific region, such that
the activity from this region averaged across all con-
ditions was above two standard deviations than the
average of the group. The bilateral RSC, the left MPFC,
and the bilateral LP all demonstrated a significant effect
related to false recognition (Table 2 for statistical val-
ues). In each of these regions, during encoding, signifi-
cantly more activity was elicited for those trials that led
to subsequent false recognition compared to those trials
that led to subsequent correct rejection of a contextually
related item. In the one ROI that demonstrated greater
activity elicited for no-context trials than context trials,
there was a nonsignificant trend for the trials that led to
correct rejections to activate more than those trials that
led to false recognition. The results from this analysis
indicate that activity in the regions that process con-
textual associations, specifically the RSC, the MPFC, and
the LP, are predictive of subsequent false recognition for
contextually related items.
Hits vs. Misses
In addition to examining the role of context in mediating
false recognition, we conducted a post hoc analysis for
other subsequent memory effects within the cortical
contextual network. The data from five participants were
removed from this specific analysis of hits versus misses
because of an insufficient number of miss trials using a
criterion of at least 10 observations. Removing these
participants did not change the trends in the false
recognition data. These ROI analyses were run on all
voxels that showed significant differential activity from
baseline for any task-related activity performed on a
participant-by-participant basis. This method allowed
us to look at subsequent memory effects for both strong
contextual items and weak contextual items, such that
the voxels chosen were not biased toward strong con-
text. Results are shown in Figure 4.
An ANOVA was run on each ROI examining the main
effect of context and subsequent recognition of old items
in each region. The statistical values can be found in Ta-
ble 3. This analysis revealed a significant main effect for
context, but not for recognition of old items (i.e., hits and
misses) in the RSC RH, MPFC RH, and bilateral LP.
Although not significant, in the left hemisphere RSC and
MPFC, the main effect of context trend was found as well.
A main effect for recognition of old items was found only
in the PHC RH. In each ROI, except for the OTS, the
weak-miss condition elicited the least amount of activity,
whereas both strong memory conditions, sometimes more
for the strong-miss condition, elicited the most amount of
activity. We propose that this pattern of activation is
a demonstration of a contextual processing gradient, such
that the most contextual processing occurs for the strong-
miss and strong-hit condition, and the least, or none at all,
occurs for the weak miss condition. This proposal will be
elaborated in the Discussion.
DISCUSSION
Consistent with our primary hypothesis, activity in cor-
tical areas related to contextual processing was found
to be predictive of subsequent false recognition of new
Table 3. ROI Statistical Values of Subsequent Memory of Old Items
ROI Context Memory Con  Mem
RSC LH F(1, 10) = 3.07, ns F(1, 10) = 0.3, ns F(1, 10) = 3.2, p <. 1
RSC RH F(1, 10) = 6.37, p < .03 F(1, 10) = 0.06, ns F(1, 10) = 0.28, ns
MPFC LH F(1, 10) = 3.01, ns F(1, 10) = 3.20, ns F(1, 10) = 0.01, ns
MPFC RH F(1, 10) = 26.58, p < .001 F(1, 10) = 0.48, ns F(1, 10) = 0.32, ns
LP LH F(1, 10) = 14.01, p < .004 F(1, 10) = 0.07, ns F(1, 10) = 0.42, ns
LP RH F(1, 10) = 7.53, p < .02 F(1, 10) = 1.05, ns F(1, 10) = 1.93, ns
PHC LH F(1, 10) = 0.91, ns F(1, 10) = 0.07, ns F(1, 10) = 2.11, ns
PHC RH F(1, 10) = 0.45, ns F(1, 10) = 5.94, p < .04 F(1, 10) = 3.31, p <. 1
OTS LH F(1, 10) = 0.26, ns F(1, 10) = 0.09, ns F(1, 10) = 4.81, p < .05
Statistical F and p values for ROI ANOVA looking at the main effect of context compared to the main effect of memory (i.e., recognition of old items)
for encoding data of old items.
All p values are for two-tailed significance.
Aminoff, Schacter, and Bar 2233items that were contextually related to items presented
at encoding. Combining behavioral and fMRI findings,
we propose that this false recognition is a result of the
coactivation of contextually associated information at
the time of encoding.
Previously we have defined the cortical network that
processescontextual associationsto include the RSC,PHC,
and MPFC (Bar & Aminoff, 2003). The cortical regions
with differential activity related to processing contextual
associations in this experiment was defined as the collec-
tion of areas showing greater activity when participants
viewed pairs of objects with strong contextual associations
compared with pairs of objects with weak contextual as-
sociations. The regions with differential activity include
both overlap with the previously defined cortical network
processing contextual associations, the RSC and MPFC,
and an additional region, the LP. The PHC, although typi-
cally associated with contextual processing, did not show
differential activity in this particular experiment, which
we propose was a result of the unique task used here.
Each region that did show differential contextual activity
also showed greater activation at encoding for pairs of
objects in which a related item was later falsely recog-
nized as old, compared with when the related item was
correctly identified as new. It is important to consider the
possible contribution of each of these regions to the
generation of contextual activation and false memories,
and we elaborate on it next.
A visual context contains associative information about
identities of objects that tend to share the same con-
text, as well as the typical spatial relations between them
when applicable. These contextual associations are bound
together in a stored memory representation referred to
as a ‘‘context frame’’ (Bar, 2004; Bar & Ullman, 1996). The
activation of a context frame presumably results in the
activation of the associations inherent to that context,
which we propose is the mechanism by which subse-
quent false recognition of contextually related items
occurs. Data from previous studies provide compelling
evidence that context frames might be stored and pro-
cessed in the RSC (Epstein, Parker, & Feiler, 2007; Park,
Intraub, Yi, Widders, & Chun, 2007; Fenske, Aminoff,
Gronau, & Bar, 2006; Bar & Aminoff, 2003).
A context frame contains prototypical information
about a specific context and, accordingly, is extracted
from specific exemplars. For example, regardless of
whether a kitchen is stainless steel modern, or country
style rustic, all typical kitchens are expected to activate
the same prototypical context frame of a ‘‘kitchen.’’ In
support of the notion that the RSC mediates context
frames, we have previously shown that the RSC is not
sensitive to the specific visual properties of contextual
representations, and processes context in a more ‘‘gist’’-
like manner (Bar & Aminoff, 2003). For example, the RSC
responds equally to a strong contextual object presented
in isolation or within a background. The strong con-
textual objects activated the RSC more than the weak
contextual objects because, in both cases, the same con-
text frame was activated, regardless of the specific visual
properties of the stimulus presented. In further support
of the idea that the RSC processes abstracted prototyp-
ical representations of context, and does not emphasize
exact physical details, we have found the RSC to be
equally active for objects strongly related to a context
of a specific place (e.g., oven) and objects that are not
related to a specific place (e.g., baby bottle) (Bar &
Aminoff, 2003). In addition, within the realm of scene
processing, evidence suggests that the RSC processes
scenes on a general, or prototypical level. For example,
Park et al. (2007) demonstrated that activity in the RSC
was related to adding information to a scene that likely
appears just beyond the borders (i.e., boundary exten-
sion); and Epstein et al. (2007) reported results suggest-
ing that the RSC processes scenes within the context of a
broader environment (e.g., a school building in relation
to the campus at large) rather than what was available in
the immediate sensory environment (e.g., information
limited to what was presented in the picture of the
building). We therefore propose that the RSC processes
a general, or prototypical, representation of a context,
reminiscent of our definition of context frames. Hence,
the activity elicited in the RSC is a manifestation of the
activation of context frames and their inherent associa-
tions. Accordingly, this activation of the associations
within a context frame is the source of subsequent false
recognition of contextually related items.
Contextual associations are naturally beneficial to cog-
nition (Davenport & Potter, 2004; Bar & Ullman, 1996;
Biederman, Mezzanotte, & Rabinowitz, 1982; Palmer,
1975): The coactivation of contextual associations can
facilitate the recognition of other objects in the environ-
ment by providing predictions about what is likely to
occur in the specific context. It has been proposed that
the role of the MPFC, in particular, is to generate pre-
dictions of what to expect in the immediate environ-
ment based on analogies linking the input with memory
(Bar, 2004, 2007). We propose that this occurs automati-
cally and is the source of the MPFC activation during
contextual processing at encoding. When participants
were asked to put the two objects into a context and
think of other objects associated with the context, the
MPFC presumably was recruited to generate top–down
predictions about the other objects that may appear in
the same context, in cooperation with other components
of the context network. The collective activation asso-
ciated with these predictions has led the participants to
falsely recognize contextually related items as ‘‘old.’’
Contextual associations not only generate predictions
but can also direct attentional resources to items in our
environment (Neider & Zelinsky, 2006; Chun & Nakayama,
2000). The third area found in the context cortical net-
work was in the LP, including parts of the inferior parietal
lobule and the supramarginal gyrus. The LP has been
implicated in orienting attention (Corbetta & Shulman,
2234 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 20, Number 122002) and in episodic memory (Wagner, Shannon, Kahn,
& Buckner, 2005). Recent work demonstrated that this
may be the area where long-term memory and attention
interact (Summerfield, Lepsien, Gitelman, Mesulam, &
Nobre, 2006). We therefore hypothesize that contextu-
ally specific processing found in this area is related to
the top–down use of contextual associations to orient
attention. Support for this proposal comes from a study
that used a repetition priming paradigm and found sim-
ilar activity in the LP related to the modulation of
attentional deployment by the integration of semantic
and spatial contextual information (Gronau, Neta, & Bar,
2008). This LP showed here increased activation for
those encoding trials that led to false recognition. It is
possible that the specific task employed here, which
required participants to think of as many other objects
as possible that might appear in that context, promoted
orienting responses while participants performed the
mental ‘‘search’’ of their memory. This idea might further
explain why activation in this area was less pronounced
in other context studies, where the task did not require
such active search of associates. Future experiments will
be required to test this hypothesis and to characterize the
involvement of this attention-related region in contextual
processing in finer detail.
Previous studies indicate that the PHC plays a central
role in processing contextual associations (Aminoff et al.,
2007; Bar et al., 2007; Fenske et al., 2006; Bar, 2004; Bar
& Aminoff, 2003). In the present study, however, no
significant PHC activity specific for strong contextual
trials was found in the group average. This lack of dif-
ferential activity between strong and weak trials might
provide additional clues regarding the role of the PHC
in contextual processing. We propose that the PHC
interacts with the RSC to activate the most appropriate
context frame(s) based on the physical appearance of a
context. While the PHC is sensitive to the specific phys-
ical properties of the input, the RSC contains a more
gist-like, prototypical representation of contexts. This
role of activating contextual associations that are rele-
vant to the current episode implies that the PHC is
sensitive to the specific aspects of the immediate envi-
ronment. In contrast to the RSC, which processes pro-
totypical representations of context abstracted from the
details of immediate environment, we propose that the
PHC processes visually specific contextual associations
that more directly relate to the immediate environment.
This proposal is supported by previous work that dem-
onstrates the PHC was sensitive to the physical prop-
erties of the stimulus, for example, whether a strong
contextual object was presented by itself or within a
scene (Bar & Aminoff, 2003). We also found the repre-
sentations within the PHC are organized along a spatial
hierarchy where more visually specific spatial represen-
tations are stored in the posterior and nonspatial repre-
sentations are stored in the anterior (Aminoff et al.,
2007). Epstein et al. (2003, 2007) have also provided
support for visually specific representations in the PHC
by demonstrating activity related to viewpoint specific
scene processing, and, furthermore, activity related to
scene recognition in the PHC was limited to the imme-
diate environment rather than a broader context. We
therefore propose that this ‘‘on-line’’ visually specific
contextual processing in the PHC reflected an attempt
to retrieve contextual associations and therefore was
equally active for both the strong context trials and the
weak context trials. In other words, in this task, the
PHC performed a similar operation of contextual acti-
vation for both strong and weak context trials, there-
fore not showing a difference between the conditions
in its response.
Although the main focus of this study concerns the role
of the context network in mediating subsequent false
recognition, it is interesting to consider the subsequent
recognition differences in remembering old items (i.e.,
hits and misses). The PHC was the ROI that yielded a
significant effect of recognition memory for old items.
This is in accordance with previously reports that indicate
a role of the PHC in the true memories as compared to
false memories (Cabeza et al., 2001). In each of the ROIs,
the strong-miss condition demonstrated a trend of acti-
vatingtheseregionsthemost,whereastheweak-misscon-
dition demonstrated a trend of activating these regions
the least. We propose that this pattern of results demon-
strates a gradient of contextual associative processing
such that the strong miss activates the related associa-
tions overly broadly such that the item-specific memory is
lost; whereas the weak misses do not activate many
associations, if any, and therefore have no cue to promote
subsequent remembering. Strong hits activated the con-
text regions more than weak hits due to the inherent
contextual associations activated by the strong items. It
was only in the PHC that the weak-hit condition activated
as much as the strong context trials. We propose that this
effect is related to the role of the PHC in carrying out ‘‘on-
line’’ processing of associations. In the attempt of the
PHC to activate contextual associations for the weak pair
of objects, some of these items may have activated an
association, although not to an extent sufficient for acti-
vating a context frame. It is possible that these associa-
tions facilitated the encoding of the item such that the
item was correctly identified as old at test (i.e., weak hit).
Further experiments will be needed to test the interac-
tion of context memory and item-specific memory, spe-
cifically testing whether there are conditions where
context memory overrides the item-specific memory.
It is important to characterize in more detail the exact
neural mechanism that gives rise to false memory. In par-
ticular, two possibilities would have to be distinguished
by future research. First, such false memory could be a
result of a spreading coactivation of contextually related
objects, whereby seeing a highly contextual object acti-
vates associated objects that belong in the same con-
text frame such that later one cannot reliably distinguish
Aminoff, Schacter, and Bar 2235between objects that were actually presented and strongly
related objects that were not presented. In a second
possible mechanism, a highly contextual object activates
a context gist that afterward is retrieved and helps
to infer old–new responses based on a global-matching
process. Previous research has shown that spreading
activation and gist information each contributes to var-
ious kinds of memory distortions (for review and discus-
sion, see Schacter & Addis, 2007; Gallo, 2006; Brainerd
& Reyna, 2005; Schacter & Slotnick, 2004), but their
respective roles in context-based false recognition is
unknown. That the RSC has been shown to represent
prototypical and non-item-specific context information
supports a gist-based mechanism, whereas the fact that a
gist can ‘‘bootstrap’’ the activation of more specific con-
text information supports a spreading activation process.
Taken together, the results of this study provide
insights into both the nature of memory distortion and
the components of the cortical network that mediate
contextual processing.
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